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At the heart of this paper sits (or quivers) a paradox, an irritation: Artaud suffuses contemporary 
theatre and philosophy. Yet Artaud, like Deleuze, arguably begs not to be written. Artaud’s work 
resists hermeneutic closure, just as Deleuze and Guattari’s pliable, plastic concepts at the outset 
attempt to resist rigidification: the ‘body without organs’, a term of Artaud’s that Deleuze and 
Guattari recuperated and transformed, once utilized as a fixed concept, loses the resistance to 
judgment and to individuation it set out to describe. I have attempted to write about Artaud for a 
number of years. I have always hit a wall as I do so. This paper attempts to untangle this impasse, 
to think through the violence of passage ‘over to’ Artaud, imagined in modern philosophy and 
performance as an island far outside of yet uncannily within all of ‘us’: primal and essential, 
incontournable, at once. This paper attempts, like Deleuze, to make philosophy “in the backs” of 
others (Deleuze [1990] 2003, 15), to resist speaking at or about but instead insolently beside or 
through others, to try to get at something else.  
This impulse is arguably contrary to the impulse of ‘criticism’, which seeks to explain, to name, and 
to theorize. In theorizing, we do what Henri Bergson (1938) suggested concepts always attempt to 
do: fix, like a photographic still, a world that is otherwise more fluid, more dynamic than they are. 
One can counter to this notion another notion, that concepts too are fluid; that they transform. 
This is what Deleuze and Guattari did in Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? [What Is Philosophy?] (1991), 
their last work together, in which they attempt to think through the task of philosophy itself. 
Philosophy, they argue, makes concepts: it fashions them; but these concepts are pliable. They 
have histories that zigzag; that encounter other histories and overlap with them. Also, one might 
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add, histories that affect other histories: concepts are always in motion. And these concepts 
‘change’ the ‘reality’ of the room: they do not just represent, but take part in the world they appear, 
according to Bergson, to describe. 
Why even try to write about Artaud? The discourse surrounding Artaud’s ‘exceptionalism’ gets, once 
again, to the heart (the gut, perhaps) of modern and contemporary philosophy and performance’s 
joint investments in the problem of criticism as a problem of judgment. Ever since Kant, if not 
before, the philosophical problem par excellence has been judgment. According to Deleuze (1993), 
in an essay on Artaud, Nietzsche, D. H. Lawrence, and Kafka, judgment binds modern philosophy 
and drama, specifically tragedy; and it has done so since the Greeks. In tragedy, judgment is the 
action around which all others lie: in Antigone, judgment of the individual against a social order 
she refuses; in Agamemnon, judgment of a father who chose power over kinship. After Kant, 
philosophers judge what is beautiful, good; what is ethical. They describe and judge. A philosopher 
who does not judge, consequently is not a philosopher: this has been the accusation leveraged 
against a long line of Continental thinkers who chose plasticity, pliability, escape over categorical 
decisions, the stark contrast of a yes or a no. After WWII and the student upheavals of May 1968 in 
Paris, hierarchies putatively dissolved or were shaken; motion came to be a principle of historical 
agency almost on its own terms, differently from what Marx had conceived. No longer were 
philosophers bringing change to the world; their whole relationship to the world was in question. 
They did not just reflect on a world exterior to them; they were part of a world, literally in the 
streets, for some. Between subject and object, a chasm fell. Philosophy had to change too. It 
became, in this sense, performative. It began to act.  
But with this acting, came further accusations of fakery, charlatanism. These philosophers only 
spun words, the dissolution between subject and object, thinking mind and hard thing did not meet 
in a moving, fluid, vital world of cross-pollination, mutually invested flows, but stopped, apparently, 
at a page on which subjects and objects became confused, indistinguishable. This was largely 
leveraged against Derrida, the writer-poet par excellence, whose attempts at decentering a center, 
remarginalizing a heavy body of philosophical thought met with equal critique, largely from the 
other side of the Channel, in debates so memorialized they hardly bear repeating here. Like 
Deleuze, Derrida met Artaud in a playful, performative space of philosophical recuperation: Artaud 
invited thinking, his work and person invited different ways of thinking, a zone between “criticism” 
and the “clinic” (“critique” and “clinique,” as Derrida writes in “La parole soufflée” [1967]). Psychiatry 
was in a shambles, in the wake of experiments by R. D. Laing, Félix Guattari and others: not only in 
the pages of Foucault’s writing, after Georges Canguilhem, but in practice, hierarchies and concepts 
of normalcy were being radically rewritten. A ‘mad’ person, an ‘aliéné mental’ may not be mad; 
according to the tenets of schizo-analysis, the world around them was madder. They became mad 
because they ‘failed’ (arguably, in one way or another, refused) to ‘fit’ within a society whose 
bureaucracies, and petty methods of social control, stifled them. In order to be ‘cured’ they only 
needed to find alternative ways of being in this world, not like Kafka crushed by the weight of 
futility, but by picking up a paintbrush, say (in the case of Mary Barnes, at the famous anti-
psychiatric Kingsley Hall [Guattari 1995]). Society had judged them; but taken from a different 
perspective, it was the society, the whole edifice of society, that was sick.  
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Critic and clinic jointly floundered, and with them tragedy and philosophy came tumbling down 
too. In their place, rose performance. And at the crest of this wave, rode the spectre of Artaud. His 
madness, from a schizoanalytical perspective, was not madness; as he wrote of Van Gogh, in Van 
Gogh, suicidé de la société (1947), the society around them was perverse. In the case of Van Gogh, it 
cannibalized a man whose pores were open, too open, like the skies at night that he painted. 
Society had seeped in through his pores to destroy him. Writing in Pour en finir avec le jugement de 
dieu (1947), his final radio play, a recording initially commissioned for public broadcast in February 
1948 but subsequently banned by Radio France, and the only true expression of the theatre of 
cruelty, in his terms, Artaud tried to do away with this sick society. To exorcise it. In his 
contemporary rendition of Artaud’s play, Kentish composer Adam de la Cour rewrites Artaud’s 
xylophonie, his cries, his screams with a graphic score reprising some of Artaud’s drawings; 
clarinettist Carl Rosman toggles between a bass clarinet, drum, and vocalization uncannily like 
Artaud’s own, while pianist Mark Knoop performs a continuous surge of highly contrasting, 
frequently tumultuous, Bach-infused noise, texture, notes. This work, L’Exorcisme du Mômo (2008), 
what de la Cour calls “an exorcism in four parts,” arguably sits entirely outside or beside judgment.1 
It also seeks to exorcise Artaud – who called himself a “mômo,” slang for “madman,” in derision 
against those who judged him as such, and in self-mockery – to purge him from a world of 
overtheorization, offer a work with, rather than at him, without regard to what it might mean to be 
delirious, schizophrenic, insane, all terms Artaud had suffered during his near decade of psychiatric 
institutionalization, beginning in 1938 at the Sainte Anne hospital, where he was admitted after an 
explosive trip to Ireland. He had gone as Saint Patrick, equipped with St. Patrick’s walking stick, in 
search of the saint’s birthplace. Dr. Jacques Lacan, who saw Artaud at Sainte Anne, described him 
as “incurable.” And for nine years, until his release from the Rodez hospital in southern France, 
Artaud was institutionalized, also malnourished, and supported from time to time, by Dr. Gaston 
Ferdière in particular, in his endeavours to draw and to write (Artaud [1947] 2003, 183).  
Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu was commissioned by Fernand Pouey for a new programme, 
« La voix des poètes » (Poets’ voices or, more accurately, the poets’ voice, in fact suggesting the 
singularity of a voice in spite of a plurality of poet bodies). Artaud spent months writing and 
subsequently recording his text, with his friends and collaborators Paule Thévenin, Roger Blin and 
Maria Casarès. But Wladimir Porché, director general at Radio France, vetoed the broadcast once 
he had heard the result.2 A surge of protestation and public debate ensued, a veritable “Affaire 
Artaud,” with articles in dozens of French newspapers on the Left and the Right pouring over the 
purported pros and cons of this decision (Artaud [1947] 2003, 190-210). Artaud came to be at the 
center of a national drama about judgment: about whether it was right or wrong to judge a work 
made by a man who was putatively exceptional, who exceeded the boundaries of good taste and 
bienséance, or normally acceptable behaviour. His recording became a “human document,” in the 
words of some, who defended its broadcast on the grounds that he was an exception.3 Many 
supporters claimed that he was a poète maudit, like Baudelaire and Rimbaud before him; the 
society itself would be judged by future generations, if like Baudelaire and Rimbaud’s 
contemporaries, it was too short-sighted to recognize a genius walking in its midst. In all this, 
Artaud dissolved. In fact, he himself experienced a reversal of his own conception of his self and 
place within or without this society. Whereas Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu called for a 
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revolution among the peasant and worker classes, whom he called upon to rise up against a 
corrupt new world order governed by the Americans and Russians racing to war and militarization, 
as well as hyper-technologization, expecting this audience of normal people to greet his work with 
open arms, he discovered after a second private broadcasting of his work that this audience was 
not yet ready. Crestfallen, he wrote in a letter to Thévenin that he had suddenly understood that 
his work was not yet ready to be received; his true audience was not yet born (Artaud [1947] 2003, 
104-5).  
This pushed his theatre of cruelty onto a future plane, and so too, as has been emphasized again 
and again by criticism in its wake, onto a plane of supposed impossibility. Artaud’s theatre is 
putatively theoretical, this view suggests, not only because he wrote few play texts (though 
Kimberly Jannarone [2010] has been at great pains to show not only that his politics were less left-
leaning than some commentators allow, but also that his theatre work as a director has been 
radically overlooked). But because his writing – his “manifesto” for a theatre of cruelty – was 
philosophical: it judged the world around it as corrupt, and proposed a vision for how this world 
could be excised, replaced, improved upon.  
Yet what these readings often fail to address is the extent to which Artaud sought real action in the 
world through his public broadcasting, a commission that had promised him an audience of 15 
million listeners. As a performance, it meant not only to reflect on, but to change the world, and it 
was actual; the recording he intended for this effect did take place. It was heard by a small so-
called “circle of initiates,” specially called on to help determine whether it would be fit for public 
consumption; and on the initiative of a new student press, Nyza, followed by the independent K 
éditeurs, it found a life on the page, though he had said publication of the text without attendant 
sounds would be a “disaster” (Artaud [1947] 2003, 98-99). 
What I aim to suggest is that with Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu, Artaud eschews modern 
philosophy and tragedy, inasmuch as he eschews the institution of judgment: that which, he says, 
he suffered from his entire life. He does this by undercutting the very concept of individuality: that 
against which, as Deleuze reminds us in “Pour en finir avec le jugement,” judgment necessarily 
strikes. Without organs organising a body into an individual person, and without a legal, social, 
political and philosophical system conceptualising of this organised body as an individual entity 
that can take action and suffer the consequences of these actions against a supposedly coherent 
social whole, the “self” dissolves into pure porosity. But also, as Artaud suggests in his radio play, 
it dissolves into the mountains, the earth. It offers an ecological, or what Guattari has called an 
ecosophical conception of human life integrated with other elements: death, stars, etc. In this view, 
as in schizoanalysis, human life is not separated from the sphere of action within which it 
purportedly operates and against which it might be judged. Without individuation, there is no 
judgment, and so too, no injustice: there can be no injustice against individual beings, since there 
are no beings who are individuated (and can be singled out). This phantasmagorical vision does 
not on that account resist intensities. On the contrary, beings are intensities, who can exercise 
violent, powerful forces through the world, but who don’t suffer the weight of gravity according to 
which there is only one way to move: forward, and down. In the dance of the Tutuguri Indians of 
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Mexico, from whom Artaud sought inspiration after his visit there in 1936, people are free to dance 
backwards, inside out (“danser à l’envers”), back to front, front to back and, above all, back to back 
(“d’arrière en avant et/ d’avant en arrière/ mais beaucoup plus d’arrière en arrière”) (Artaud [1947] 
2003, 33-35; see also Artaud 1971a; Artaud 1971b). This radically decenters the world of dance and 
theatre and concepts of individuality on which modern philosophy and tragedy are based.  
At the same time, Artaud was violently disindividualized, in a different sense: a vulturous, yet 
paradoxically adulating projection of his person onto an abstract plane that said he represented 
exceptionalism as such, the exceptionalism of poet outcasts, martyrs of a society that wanted to 
see itself as progressive, enlightened, but was afraid of the retrospective judgment, the mockery, 
of French society – and potentially of the world’s – hindsight. If Artaud was to have been considered 
a genius, these men and women who had chastised him would look like fools.  
In Omar Shahryar, Joanna Young, Sarah Eldin and Felipe Otondo’s To have done with the judgment 
of Artaud, performed at the Edinburgh Fringe festival in 2007 (Base Theatre 2007), Artaud once 
again appears as a spectral individual it is impossible to reckon with except by recorporealizing his 
cries, juxtaposing these to recordings he himself made, and which are now publicly available 
(Artaud 1947; Artaud [1947] 1995; Artaud [1947] 1996). The entanglement of representation, 
recorporealization, and repetition, reverberation or echo uncannily pay homage to Artaud’s work 
and refuse the homage, transforming his work in the process. Their piece offers a version of his 
work that by its title already refuses the hyperindividualization and what I would venture to call the 
discourse of utter alterity that has surrounded him, subjecting Artaud to a public theatre of support 
purporting an enlightened refusal of judgment that paradoxically judges him on the same. In this 
view, he is so exceptional he is not even allowed to attend his own public trial. 
This making-tragedy of his life and work has rendered it aporetic, impossible, and at the same time 
hypertrophic: Artaud becomes the tragic hero, in a drama of reindividuation whose only outcome 
seems to be an infinitely receding philosophical discourse predicated on his utter alterity: an utter 
alterity he refused, as he sought to remain both like everyone else and multiple. In an article on 
the use of the “schizophrenic” in contemporary theory, Catherine Prendergast (2008) takes Deleuze 
and Guattari, Baudrillard, Jameson, and others to task for relying on the figure of the “exceptional” 
schizophrenic as representative of all that is non-normative, anti-capitalistic, creative, disinhibited, 
free, and ultimately more closely connected to reality than everyone else. She argues that a far 
greater number of “unexceptional” than “exceptional” schizophrenics populate the halls of 
hospitals, schools and factories in everyday life, and that they are not helped by the grossly 
distorted, romantic terms postmodern and poststructuralist theory have imposed. These 
“unexceptional” schizophrenics, she points out, are concerned with job retention, benefits, medical 
care, and the not insignificant challenge of having their own “voice.” Paradoxically, Artaud too, the 
quintessential, arguably the paradigmatic “exceptional” schizophrenic in modern and 
contemporary thought, suffered from this same discourse of exceptionalism, which extracted him 
from the simple, stupid pleasures of human concourse and horizontal affiliation.  
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In attempting to dramatize the violence of judgment and of the institutions that box and quarter 
people who fail to fit these bounds – all of whom suffer in one way or another from this 
disconnection – Artaud made a work in which he attempted performatively to extract himself from 
the individualizing impulse of philosophy, a stand-in for the God who judges, while maintaining in 
everyday life to be an individual capable of political agency. That he has only come to be all the 
more adulated in philosophy and attendant fields suggests that the performance of self-
immolation, negativity and refusal, only excites critique further. Criticism and clinicalism are still 
not so far apart. Even poststructuralist philosophy, which performs flow, and attempts to think-
with, teeters at the edge of hypertrophism.  
 
This is why I did not want to write on Artaud, and yet why, at the outset of a venture that purports 
explosively to commingle philosophy and drama, in a performative orgasm of holy communion, it 
seems urgent to attempt to reckon again with what may be construed as an originary act, a 
moment of drama and philosophy that is arguably also neither.  
 
 
1 L’exorcisme du Mômo was premiered at the Schott recital room (De la Cour 2010), and performed again at 
Clapham Omnibus, part of the Infancy, History & the Avant-Garde festival (2015) curated by Steve Potter and myself.  
2 Detailed notes regarding the scandal surrounding Artaud’s commission by Fernand Pouey and its subsequent 
ban by Porché, as well as excerpts from the press and attendant documents, appear in Artaud ([1947] 2003), 190-
228. Artaud’s letters are reproduced in Artaud ([1947] 2003), 83-105. See also esp. Artaud (1974). 
3 The term appears simultaneously on 7 February 1948 in an article by Max Favalelli in Paris-Presse, cited in Artaud 
([1947] 2003), 203, and by the journalist René Guilly in the leftist Combat; Guilly calls Artaud’s work an “exceptional 
human document” [“un document humain exceptionnel”] (Artaud [1947] 2003, 218). Pierre Laroche wrote on 11 
February in the satirical Le Canard enchaîné that the radio broadcast was “a surprising human – even superhuman 
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